

Can The Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) Enable A Marine Expeditionary Brigade?

CSC 2000

SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues

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## Executive Summary

**Title:** CAN THE MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABLE) STILL ENABLE A MARINE EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADE?

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**Thesis:** The MEU(SOC) capabilities may limit its ability to enable an Amphibious MEB but it is fully capable of enabling both a Maritime Prepositioning Force and Air Task Force MEB.

**Discussion:** The MEU(SOC) program has been under attack for many years by those who believe it has become too SOC-centric. When the Commandant announced that the Marine Corps would reestablish the MEB, the critics renewed their attacks on the MEU(SOC) program stating it was not capable of conducting enabling missions in support of the MEB. An examination of the three types of MEBs, (Air Task Force, Maritime Prepositioning Force, and Amphibious Task Force), was conducted and requirements unique to each MEB were identified. These requirements were compared with the capabilities of the MEU(SOC) and deficiencies were noted. Concurrently, deficiencies were noted in the ability of the Marine Corps and Navy to support amphibious operations.

**Conclusion:** The MEU(SOC) is adequately trained and capable of enabling an ACF or MPF MEB, provided support is allocated to ensure naval and air superiority. The MEU(SOC) has difficulty supporting an ATF MEB enabling mission. The major deficiency associated with supporting the ATF enabling mission is the MEU(SOC)'s limited ability to conduct forcible entry on a defended beach. Without the ability to provide a lodgment for the MEB, the MEU's capability is limited to conducting pre-assault shaping and reconnaissance operations. Capability deficiencies extended beyond the MEU(SOC) and included significant deficiencies in the capabilities of the Marine Corps and Navy to support amphibious operations.

## INTRODUCTION

The Marine Corps' Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)) program has been deploying MEU(SOC)s to all corners of the world for over 15 years. During that time, the capabilities and value of these units to the Marine Corps has been well documented and this program has often been referred to as the "Crown Jewel" of the Marine Corps.<sup>1</sup> These units continued to evolve and, as the primary forward deployed MAGTF, they gained the support of the regional Commander in Chiefs (CinCs) and the joint community. Too much specialization can be bad for any organization. Some would argue that the MEU(SOC) program has focused too much on special operations and have become special operations capable centric. They would argue that as the MEUs evolved they lost the ability to function outside the myopic world of crisis reaction and limited special operations. They would also argue that the MEU could no longer conduct enabling missions in supporting the Marine Corps single force concept. For the purpose of this paper, the definition of "enabling mission" as presented in MCRP 5-12C will be used.

A time-sensitive mission generally of short duration assigned to a military force to make possible the introduction of follow-on forces. Minimum task or functions to be accomplished must be specified in the mission order or other directive. Specific enabler tasks are situationally dependent and may include initial on-scene situational assessments and requirements development; essential communications information systems connectivity with pertinent command and control elements; intelligence operations; critical force protection task; provision of essential logistical support; liaison with U.S. country team, host nation, nongovernmental organizations and coalition military officials.<sup>2</sup>

This paper will examine MEU(SOC) capabilities with regard to enabling the three types of Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) and resource deficiencies

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<sup>1</sup> Hammes, Thomas X. "Polishing the Crown Jewels." *Marine Corps Gazette*, March 1998, 18.

<sup>2</sup> MCRP 5-12C, Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Washington: GPO, 1998. 52.

associated with enabling each of these types of MEBs. This paper will demonstrate that MEU(SOC) capabilities may limit its ability to enable an amphibious MEB, but it is fully capable of enabling both a Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) and an Air Contingency Force (ACF) MEB.

## **Assumptions**

In preparation of this paper, the following assumptions were made:


- 1.** That the MEU will remain an independent maneuver element and not be subsumed by the MEB when tasked to enable an amphibious MEB.
- 2.** That when the Marine Corps publishes its final doctrine concerning the employment and structure of the MEB, it will parallel the content contained in the current draft concept posted on the Marine Corps' Doctrine Division Home Page on 21 February 2000.
- 3.** That the commitments within regional theaters will continue to require MEU(SOC) capabilities.
- 4.** That the MEU(SOC) will remain the primary forward deployed MAGTF within the Marine Corps.

## Chapter 1

### Background

#### The Marine Corps' Single Force Concept

Since the Marine Corps received its first aircraft, it has organized and fought as a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). Four levels of MAGTF organization exist within the Marine Corps that can be task organized to any size to meet any situation. Three of the four MAGTFs (the MEF, MEB, and MEU) are standing MAGTFs, while the fourth, a Special Purpose MAGTF, is formed when the requirements dictate a different organization than that of a standing MAGTF. There are three active duty MEFs within the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps views these MEFs as a single force and employs the appropriate level of MAGTF into a theater depending on the requirements of the crisis or situation presented. Figure 1 depicts where the Marine Corps envisions each level of MAGTF operating along the conflict continuum.



**Figure 1**  
Level of Conflict Continuum

The Marine Corps envisions the employment of the different MAGTFs in direct relationship to the level of conflict. The MEU(SOC)s being the smallest standing MAGTF are deployed on a continuous rotation as the forward element of the MEF. They are designed to operate at the lowest level on the conflict continuum and provide the Commanders in Chiefs (CinC) and National Command Authority (NCA) with a rapid response, quick reaction force with limited capabilities in conventional and select maritime special operations. Appendix A is provided for further discussion of MEU(SOC) capabilities. As the situation develops and escalates beyond the capabilities of the MEU(SOC) the MEF would flow the medium sized MAGTF, the MEB into the theater. The role of the MEU(SOC) at this point is to conduct an enabling mission to assist the arrival of the MEB. The MEB is designed to respond to conflicts that reside in the middle of the conflict continuum, small-scale contingencies to larger regional conflicts. As the conflict continues to escalate and exceeds the capability of the MEB, the MEF would flow the rest of its assets into the theater and continue to conduct operations at the next higher level. Just as the MEU(SOC) was tasked to enable the MEB, now the MEB becomes tasked with the enabling mission for the MEF. The MEF is designed to operate at the highest levels of conflict from major regional conflicts to major theater wars. This single force concept of fighting the MEF gives the Marine Corps great flexibility and allows for a seamless flow of forces to flow into a theater, building combat power as the situation dictates.

## **History and Plight of the MEB**

Until the early 1990's, the MEB being the mid-sized MAGTF provided the Marine Corps with many valuable functions. A MEB could be organized as a Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF), an Air Contingency Force (ACF), or an Amphibious Task Force (ATF) and be transported to an area of operations by sea, air, or a combination of both. Doctrinally it was the smallest MAGTF capable of conducting a forcible amphibious entry. It bridged the gap between the MEU and the MEF, and it had a dedicated staff to conduct planning and training. It logically supported the Marine Corps' concept of a single force, transitioning as the situation dictated. After the Gulf War, the Marine Corps was forced by Congress to begin a force structure reduction. The Marine Corps formed a Force Structure Planning Group (FSPG) to examine where the Marine Corps could make the required reductions. At the end of the study, the FSPG concluded that the Marine Corps could not afford the standing Table of Organization associated with the MEBs and recommended, as a way to comply with the requirement to reduce force structure, the elimination of the MEB command elements. In 1991, based on the recommendations of the FSPG, the Commandant of the Marine Corps disestablished the MEBs and replaced them with an organization called the MEF Forward (MEF Fwd).<sup>3</sup> The MEF Fwd was an attempt to retain the capabilities associated with the MEB without increasing force structure and having a separate standing MEB staff. The MEF Fwd was comprised of members of the MEF staff that were designated to hold collateral duties as staff members of the MEF Fwd. This organizational change from the MEB to the MEF Fwd had far reaching implications that would not be fully realized for years to come.

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<sup>3</sup> United States Marine Corps, Doctrine Division Home Page. Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Draft) [Online] Available: <http://wwwdoctrine.quantico.usmc.mil>, 21 February 2000.

These implications surfaced as problems in the mid 1990s that manifested themselves in three forms: first, it created a void in the brigade level planning and training; second, it created a gap between the MEUs and the MEFs; and third, the MEF Fwd was not clearly understood by the Joint community.

### **The Void**

With the elimination of the standing MEB command elements, the Marine Corps lost the dedicated staff that devoted the necessary planning required to train and exercise brigade level operations. Under the MEF Fwd concept, officers on the already undermanned MEF staff were assigned the collateral duties of planning and developing training plans for deploying a MEF Fwd. In reality, due to the nature of priority given to collateral duties, the MEF Fwd was nothing more than an advance party for the MEF and not the stand alone MAGTF it was designed to replace. A brigade level exercise conducted on the west coast of California in 1998, Kernel Blitz, consisted of nothing more than an ad hoc brigade comprised of a ready MEU and another MEU in work-ups that for the most part conducted independent training concurrently off the coast of California.

### **The Gap**

The disestablishment of the MEBs and the lack of a credible replacement eliminated the bridge between the MEU and the MEF. This bridge is what promoted the seamless transition in the Marine Corps single force war-fighting concept and prevented a gap between the MEU and the MEF. The MEU, with its limited firepower and sustainability ashore, became the tip the spear with nothing behind it but the MEF. This gap grew and

the roles of the MAGTFs within the MEF changed. The MEUs continued to prosper and thrive in the areas of humanitarian operations, peacekeeping missions, and select maritime special operations. They continued to specialize in the areas that did not require large combat capabilities or long periods of sustainment ashore. They sold themselves as a rapid response MAGTF with limited maritime special operation capabilities.

The MEF, on the other hand, assumed the role of warfighter in the Marine Corps. This was a logical outcome based on who was filling the billets of the MEF Fwd. The last gap that surfaced was the way the MEF Fwd was deployed. In all instances, elements of the MEF Fwd were flown into the theater. This increased the distance between the MEUs and MEFs, because the MEUs were never required to enable any portion of the MEF Fwd other than some administrative coordination with a host nation.

### **The Confusion**

The elimination of the MEB not only created problems within the Marine Corps but caused problems in the joint community as well. The problem that surfaced revolved around the understanding of what capabilities the MEF Fwd brought into a theater. The CinCs and joint community understood the traditional MEU, MEB, MEF structure and how they were employed. When the Marine Corps disestablished the MEB and replaced it with the MEF Fwd, the CinCs and joint community did not understand what actually comprised a MEF Fwd. The Marine Corps' answer, since there was no standing table of organization for a MEF Fwd, was that a MEF Fwd could be task organized to meet the needs of anything between a MEU and a MEF. Although consistent with the MAGTF concept of task organizing a unit as required, this answer did nothing to ease the

apprehension of the CinCs and joint community. The Marine Corps continued to promote the MEF Fwd as a MEB equivalent but the CinCs and joint community could not relate the capabilities of a MEF Fwd to anything tangible.

These problems continued throughout the 1990s. In the summer of 1999, the Commandant, General J. L. Jones, announced that the Marine Corps would be reestablishing the MEB. His decision to reestablish the MEBs was based on two issues: first, it would resolve the problems associated with understanding and employing a MEF Fwd; second, it would help provide relief for the Army's brigades that were experiencing high utilization rates. The reemergence of the MEB would solve the Marine Corps' credibility problem concerning a brigade size MAGTF and assist in providing relief to the Army.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> United States Marine Corps, Doctrine Division Home Page. Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Draft) [Online] Available: <http://wwwdoctrine.quantico.usmc.mil>., 21 February 2000.

## **Chapter 2**

### **Reemergence of the MEB**

The reactivation of three MEB command elements took place between November 1999 and January 2000. Similar to the how the Marine Corps established the MEF Fwd, the staffs of the MEBs were embedded within the MEF staff. Time will tell if the decision to source the staff from the MEF staff is wise or just a continuation of the mistake made over ten years ago. Like its predecessor, the new MEB is capable of deploying any in one or a combination of three forms; an ACF, an MPF, or an ATF. With this reemergence, the ability of the MEU to perform an enabling mission in support of the MEB is once again at question. Each of these MEBs has different types of requirements. These requirements and other resource deficiencies must be considered when determining the MEU's capabilities to support enabling missions.

#### **Air Contingency Force MEB (ACF MEB)**

The ACF MEB, relying solely on aviation for transport into a theater, has fewer requirements to enable it. However, those requirements are very significant and become notable limitations. The ACF MEB has two major requirements, aviation lift and a secure air facility that can accept the MEB. To transport this MEB requires an enormous amount of lift sorties from the Air Force. If the MEB is formed armor heavy, the lift requirements increase exponentially. 1<sup>st</sup> MEB anticipates it would require the equivalent of (7) C-5 lifts just to move the core of the MEB (300

passengers and 360 short tons).<sup>5</sup> This estimate does not include the remaining 14,000-17,000 personnel, any large end items or the droves of smaller equipment. To give some idea of the lift required to move an aviation unit, the Army in its deployment to Albania required 542 missions from the Air Force just to transport an aviation task force of roughly a brigade equivalent. These missions totaled 1,271 sorties and delivered 24,095 short tons of equipment and materials.<sup>6</sup> Undoubtedly, this is one of the reasons the Army is seeking to improve its expeditionary nature. Although this transgression may not fully relate to the Marine Corps ATF, it does give some perspective to the amount of lift required to move an aviation unit. The air facility must meet three requirements to be suitable for ACF MEB operations. The three requirements are location, capacity, and security. The first requirement of the air facility is that it is in a location that will support MEB operations. Once the MEB is on the ground, it needs to be in a location that it can engage in operations without having to traverse long distances cross-country. It would do no good to land an ACF MEB in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia when it would be conducting operations on the Kuwaiti-Iraq boarder. The movement of the MEB over distances as this would be an operation in itself. Preferably, the air facility would be close enough to the sea to allow for rotary-wing resupply from naval shipping. If the air facility is located beyond the capability of rotary-wing resupply, the ACF MEB would have to rely on C-130s or the Air Force to provide dedicated lift support to build up the supplies and

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<sup>5</sup> Knutson, Bruce B. LtGen., Excerpts from a Lecture given to the students of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College on 19 January 2000. The MEB “core” refers to the MEB Command Element. The MEB “core” includes the MEB staff, a MHG detachment, and a rifle company minus for force protection. Information used with permission.

<sup>6</sup> Helland, Samuel T. BGen., Lecture given to the students of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College on 7 February 2000. Information used with permission.

combat power required to sustain the MEB for any operation in excess of 30 days. The second requirement of the air facility is that the air facility needs to have the capacity to accept the ACF MEB in both runway length and ramp space. A C-5 requires a minimum runway length of 12,200 feet, a C-17 and C-130 requires a minimum of 3000 feet.<sup>7</sup> The minimum amount of ramp space required is enough to support the off –load of two C-5 equivalent aircraft at one time. Obviously, the more ramp space available the better suited the air facility is for enabling ACF MEB operations. The final requirement of the air facility is that it is secure from enemy intervention during the introduction and build-up of the MEB. This requires sufficient air superiority to ensure the MEBS safety until the MEB has sufficient operational air defense assets in theater and can assume the air defense role to the best of their ability. This also requires protection from both conventional and asymmetrical ground threats during the off-load process. All these requirements have a pronounced affect on the MEU and its ability to conduct an enabling mission.

Another option for the ACF MEB is to “fall-in” on prepositioned equipment, similar to the Norway Air landed MEB, which was designed to rapidly counter the Soviet threat in Northwestern Europe.<sup>8</sup>

### **Maritime Propositioned Force MEB (MPF MEB)**

The MPF MEB, larger than the ACF MEB, has different enabler requirements and presents a different set of limitations. The MPF MEB has two major requirements: a

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<sup>7</sup> Federation of American Scientists, US Military Aircraft. [Online]. Available: <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/>.

<sup>8</sup> FMFRP 2-12, Marine Air-Ground Task Force: A Global Capability. Washington D.C. GPO, 1991. 28.

secure port and a secure airfield. Within these two requirements are multiple sub-requirements that are necessary to facilitate and ensure an MPF MEB success. MPF MEB operations require a suitable port to conduct the off-load of the MEBs equipment. The port must support the needs of the Military Sea Command (MSC) charter ships in both water depth and pier-side berthing. MSC ships do have a capability to off-load in-stream, but this capability is very limited and extremely sea state dependant. To successfully enable this type of MEB, sufficient naval and air superiority is required to ensure the sea lines of communication (SLOC) remain open and the port is secure from effective naval or air interdiction. Finally, if the MEB is assigned movement aboard Naval shipping, sufficient amphibious transport shipping must exist.

The second major requirement for enabling this type of MEB is the availability of an air facility to fly in MEB personnel. This air facility has the same three sub-requirements as the ACF MEB: location, capacity, and security. In addition to the location requirements associated with the ACF MEB, the air facility needs to be geographically located in a position that supports the link-up of personnel from the airfield to the equipment at the port.

The enabling limitations associated with this type of MEB range from port suitability, to the distance between the port and air facility, to the lack of naval shipping. Port selection criteria are based on the requirements to support MSC shipping. Draft depths and pier space become the limiting factors. MSC ships do have the capability to off-load in-stream, but the additional cost in time is substantial and the sea state limitations are very restrictive

(realistically no greater than sea state 2<sup>9</sup>). The second limitation associated with the MPF MEB is the distance between the port and the air facility. As personnel are flown into the air facility, the MEB incurs a requirement to transport the personnel in order to link them up with the equipment at the port. This may sound like a simple requirement but even in the most benign environment, the transportation of more than 16,000 people is always a challenge. Therefore, the distance between the port and the air facility becomes an important requirement and an enabling limitation.

A third enabling requirement that becomes a limitation associated with the MPF MEB is the sealift capabilities of the U. S. Navy. If required, it is debatable if the Navy has the assets to conduct this type of lift without seriously degrading its ability to respond to other commitments. The subject of amphibious lift will be discussed in detail later in the paper.

The final requirement that poses limitations on the MPF MEB is the issue of time. MPF operations require an enormous amount of time to execute. LtGen Knutson, I MEF Commanding Officer, stated in a brief at the Marine Corps University's Command and Staff College, that it was estimated from the time a execute order was received it would take in excess of two weeks before an MPF MEB would be fully capable of offensive operations.<sup>10</sup> All these requirements become limitations for the MPF MEB and affect the MEU's ability to conduct an enabling mission.

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<sup>9</sup>United States Navy, Universal Naval Task List, Section 4, Conditions for Joint and Naval Task, defines sea state as: **Sea State** - Roughness of seas caused by wind or disturbances. *Descriptors*: Calm to Slight (Beaufort Force < 5, Sea State 3 or less, seas 4 ft or less); Moderate (Beaufort Force 5, Sea State 4, seas 4-8 ft), Rough (Beaufort Force 6-7, Sea State 5-6, seas 8-16 ft), Very Rough (Beaufort Force 8-9, Sea State 6, seas 17- 20), High (Beaufort Force 10, Sea State 7, seas 20-30 ft) Extremely rough (Beaufort Force above 10, Sea State above, seas above 30 ft). [Online]. Available: [http://www.nwdc.navy.mil/untl/section\\_4.htm](http://www.nwdc.navy.mil/untl/section_4.htm).

<sup>10</sup> Knutson, Bruce B. LtGen., Paraphrase from a Lecture given to the students at the Marine Corps University, Command and Staff College on 19 January 2000. Information used with permission.

## Amphibious Task Force MEB (ATF MEB)

The requirements of the ATF MEB differ from those of the MPF and ACF MEBs in two ways: first, it does not need forces ashore to conduct the initial phases of the assault; second, the requirements are focused on setting the stage for a successful forcible entry. The ATF MEB can conduct the assault with the initial assault echelon completely self-sustained from the sea. The Navy's capability to provide adequate shipping and or the



**Figure 2**  
5<sup>th</sup> MEB enroute to the Persian

availability of an air facility will determine how, once the AE is ashore, the assault follow-on echelons are phased ashore, (i.e., either transported by ship or flown in as part of a fly in echelon). Besides the obvious

requirement to maintain naval and air superiority, the crux of the ATF MEB requirements resides with the Navy's ability to provide adequate amphibious shipping and fire support.

The Department of the Navy cites, in the Integrated Amphibious Operations and USMC Air Support Requirements, a requirement of fourteen amphibious ships to conduct an amphibious assault with an ATF MEB.<sup>11</sup> This requirement, based on numerous after action reports from the 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> MEBs during Desert Storm, is grossly underestimated.

The last planned employment of an ATF MEB was during the Persian Gulf War in 1990. In this case, both the 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> MEBs embarked their assault echelon (AE) on thirteen amphibious ships, (see Figure 2). The balance of the load-out was on MSC shipping which

<sup>11</sup> Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps. Department of the Navy, Integrated Amphibious Operations and USMC Air Support Requirements. Washington: GPO 1990. 68.

required a secure port to reconfigure the equipment before being capable of supporting an amphibious assault. Both units submitted numerous after action reports stating that the minimum number of amphibious ships required to adequately transport an ATF MEB in support of an amphibious assault were between nineteen and twenty-two ships.<sup>12</sup> The Navy has a current inventory of forty-three amphibious ships with the number expected to decline to thirty-six by the year 2010.<sup>13</sup> Of those forty-three ships, four are command ships, and two are hospital ships. This leaves the Navy thirty-seven amphibious troop carriers capable of conducting amphibious operations. The Navy and Marine Corps deploy three Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG)/MEU teams continuously from the East Coast, West Coast, and Okinawa, Japan. These ARG/MEU teams are comprised of three amphibious ships each. That means that at any given time twelve of the thirty-seven amphibious ships will be committed on deployments throughout the world. Of those thirty-seven amphibious ships, four are permanently stationed in Sasebo, Japan, sixteen are on the West Coast, and seventeen are on the East Coast. This means the Navy would have to transfer ships from one coast to another just to fill out a MEB with the requisite nineteen to twenty-two ships. This scenario has assumed all amphibious ships would be available for tasking and not committed to any other commitments or affected by shipyard maintenance schedules. The Mission Area Analysis LHA Replacement study conducted by Logicon Inc., states that MSC ships would make up the difference in amphibious shipping.<sup>14</sup> Besides, having the requirement for adequate shipping, the ATF MEB also requires fire support in the form of naval surface fire support (NSFS) and aviation

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<sup>12</sup> Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Marine Corps Lessons Learned [CD-ROM], 1996.

<sup>13</sup> Insert, Marine Corps Gazette, March 2000, I-1-I-4.

<sup>14</sup> Logicon, Inc. Mission Area Analysis LHA Replacement. Studies and Analysis Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command. 6-24.

offensive air support. Both of these requirements (i.e., amphibious lift and fire support) are current limitations that can seriously hinder the MEU's ability to conduct an enabling mission and the success of an ATF MEB.

This chapter explored the requirements and limitations of each of the MEBs currently being reactivated by the Marine Corps. Using this as the basis for evaluation, chapter 3 will explore the MEU(SOC)'s ability to satisfy these requirements when tasked to conduct enabling missions in support of the MEB.

## **Chapter 3**

### **The MEU(SOC) and the Enabling Mission**

The MEU(SOC) is designed to operate at the lower ends of the conflict continuum and is extremely capable of performing the majority of the missions associated with enabling the different types of MEBs. This chapter will examine the MEU(SOC)'s capability to enable each of the different types of MEBs and will identify short falls in the MEU's capabilities.

#### **ACF MEB**

As discussed in chapter 2, the ACF MEB requires a secure airfield, preferably, close enough to allow resupply from the sea and capable of handling large fixed wing aircraft in order to introduce the MEB into a theater. The MEU has many inherent capabilities that enhance its ability to perform this type of mission. A MEU is well qualified to seize and secure an airfield and allow the introduction of an ACF MEB. MEU's routinely plan and train for airfield seizures during all phases of their pre-deployment work-ups and evaluations. The MEU has the capability of accomplishing this type of mission in a benign or moderately defended environment. In addition to seizing the airfield, the MEU can provide reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S), initial terminal guidance (ITG), signal intelligence (SIGINT), and limited airfield operation capabilities to include tower communications, navigational aid support and refueler capabilities. Limitations that would hinder the MEU's ability to accomplish this mission include the distance between the airfield and ARG shipping, the type of enemy defenses located at the airfield, and the enemy air threat. The MEU's main limitations are its ability to project force long distances

inland and its limited firepower. The MEU is limited in the distance it can project Marines inland from the sea with organic assets due to the limited range of its aviation assets. The most capable aviation asset in the MEU's inventory for this type of mission is the CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopter. The Sea Stallion is capable of carrying 55 combat loaded marines, with the use of centerline seats, in excess of 200 nautical miles (nm) without refueling. Utilizing the in-flight refueling capability, a Sea Stallion's range is extended dramatically. The limitation then becomes one of continuous flight hours placed on the aircrew and helicopter. A second limitation of the MEU is that a MEU(SOC) normally only deploys with four CH-53E. This type of operation would place a tremendous strain on the pilots and aircraft limiting the amount of support the MEU could provide. Without relying on the CH-53E, the next capable aircraft in the MEU's inventory is the CH-46E, which is dramatically less capable than the CH-53E. The MEU does have the option of establishing a forward arming and refueling point (FARP) to extend the range of its helicopters, but even this option has its limitations. Moreover, the establishment of a FARP would quickly drain resources that would be required to secure and prepare the airfield for the MEBs arrival.

The next limitation the MEU(SOC) must overcome is its inability to defend against an armored or mechanized force in open terrain.<sup>15</sup> The MEU has limited anti-armor capabilities. Very few MEUs deploy with tanks and, when they do, they only carry four. The final limitation is the issue of the enemy air threat. The MEU has very limited anti-air assets consisting of the AV-8Bs, AH-1Ws, and LAAD detachment. With the requirement for air superiority before the introduction of an ACF MEB, the MEU will require aviation

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<sup>15</sup> MCO 3120.9A. Policy For Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)) 1997, 13.

support from non-organic assets. This could be in the form of naval air from the carrier battle group, land based aircraft or any combination of the two.

Provided the MEU can overcome these limitations and gain the support that is not organic, it is capable of conducting an enabling mission in support of an ACF MEB.

## **MPF MEB**

Similar to the ACF, the MPF MEB requires a secure airfield, and has the additional requirement of a secure port in order to off-load the MEB's equipment. The same considerations, capabilities, and limitations as discussed concerning the ACF MEB when securing an airfield apply to the MPF MEB. In addition, emphasis must be placed on the effect that distance between the port and air facility will have on the MEU, especially if both are contested. To accomplish this type of mission, where the distance becomes an issue, the ARG/MEU would most likely have to conduct split ARG operations, which limits the amount of combat power a MEU can project on any one objective.<sup>16</sup> Although a MEU(SOC) is quite capable of performing both missions simultaneously, it is limited by its ability to support concurrent operations with large numbers of escort aircraft. The MEU only has (4) AH-1Ws, (3) UH-1Ns, and (6) AV-8Bs to conduct OAS and escort. Splitting the aircraft to cover two objectives reduces the depth and sustainability a MEU(SOC) can provide.

Just as ARG/MEU trains for airfield seizures, it also trains for the mission of port seizures as a core capability. The ARG/MEU team possesses assets in the form of a Sea Air Land (SEAL) detachment and the Maritime Special Purpose Force (MSPF) supported

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<sup>16</sup> Split ARG operations. Operations where one or more of the ARG ships and MEU assets will detach from the main ARG to cover another contingency.

by other MEU assets that specialize in maritime missions of this type. As part of the MEU(SOC) evaluation and certification program, the ARG/ MEU is required to perform dual site operations that usually force the ARG to perform split ARG operations.<sup>17</sup> Although the ARG/MEU is capable of and well suited to perform this type of mission in support of an MPF MEB, it will need additional support to ensure naval and air superiority. The ARG/MEU possesses limited capabilities when faced with a naval surface or aerial threat. The defensive capabilities are limited to the ships missile defense system, aviation assets, LAAD assets, and various Battalion Landing Team (BLT) weapon systems. This defensive posture is designed for emergency defense of the amphibious task force and is employed as a last ditch effort to protect the task force. The offensive capability is limited to the aviation assets, the AV-8Bs and AH-1Ws, neither of which specializes in anti-shipping or anti-air missions. In order for the ARG/MEU to enjoy naval and air superiority, outside assets will have to be provided to perform those functions. Once these limitations are addressed, the MEU is capable of conducting airfield and port seizures and enabling an MPF MEB into a theater.

## **ATF MEB**

The ATF MEB, with its requirement to conduct a forcible entry, becomes the most difficult MEB for a MEU to enable. By design, the MEU is not capable of amphibious forced entry across a defended beach, and the missions it could conduct are limited to advance operations in support of the MEB's assault. These missions include R&S, SIGINT, deception operations, limited raids, hydrographic surveys of the landing beaches,

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<sup>17</sup> MCO 3120.9A. Policy For Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)) 1997, 13.

and shaping operations in preparation of the amphibious assault. It is conceivable that a MEU(SOC) could secure a lodgment in advance of the MEB's arrival provided the landing beach was lightly defended or not contested. In this type of scenario, provided they were not expected to encounter heavy resistance or a mechanized force, a MEU(SOC) could perform the all functions and enable an ATF MEB through the establishment of a lodgment. Barring the unlikely occurrence of a benign or non-contested landing, the MEU could become a force multiplier, providing additional assets during the pre-assault phase and reinforcements during the assault and critical phase of establishing a lodgment. Once the lodgment was established, the MEU(SOC) could re-embark on ARG shipping in preparation for further tasking from either the CinC or JTF Commander. As stated in the introduction, the assumption was made that the MEU would remain an independent maneuver element and not subsumed by the MEB. This assumption or concept has merit, because it allows the CinC or JTF commander the flexibility to utilize the MEU(SOC) as a rapid response force available for other crisis's within his theater. General Clark, use of the 26<sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC) is an excellent example of why a CinC would want to retain the MEU(SOC) as an independent element. Within his theater, he had multiple JTFs operating concurrently: the Army in Albania, Croatia, and the 26<sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC) conducting security operations in Operation Shining Hope.<sup>18</sup> Had a MEB been ordered into Albania in support of Operation Shining Hope and subsumed the MEU, the CinC would have lost the flexibility of using the MEU(SOC) to conduct security operations in Kosovo as part of Task Force Falcon.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Jurney, William M. An Operational Overview, Marine Corps Gazette, November 1999, 46.

<sup>19</sup> Seigel, Adam., Noer, John., and Geis, Mark.. The MEU(SOC)s and the Kosovo Campaign: A Precedent for the Future? Center for Naval Analyses, 1999, 2-3.

In summary, the MEU(SOC), as currently organized and trained, is capable of fully enabling the ACF and MPF MEBs and can perform limited enabling functions for the ATF MEB. The major deficiency associated with supporting the ATF enabling mission is the MEU(SOC)'s limited ability to conduct forcible entry on a defended beach. In addition, all three enabling missions require the MEU(SOC) to be augmented by additional naval and aviation assets to secure superiority in the greater operating area.

## **Chapter 4**

### **Other Considerations**

This chapter is designed to address other issues that, while not necessarily capabilities or limitations of the MEU(SOC), directly affect the MEU(SOC)'s ability to accomplish an enabling mission. Areas that will be explored are the relationships between the MEU and the MEB, and Naval deficiencies.

#### **MEU – MEB Relationship**

Should the MEB subsume the MEU upon arrival in the theater or should the MEU(SOC) remain an independent maneuver element? This question encompasses three issues. The first issue is whether the MEU(SOC) is an enabling force or a force provider. The second issue concerns unity of command and command relationships. The third issue concerns training differences and qualifications.

#### **Force Enabler or Provider**

In the Marine Corps' concept of the single force, is the MEU(SOC) a force enabler or a force provider? The proposed doctrine concerning the reactivation of the MEB is vague and essentially states that it is the option of the theater CinC. The Marine Corps envisions the single force concept as each unit enabling the next larger force. The definition of an enabling mission, "a time-sensitive mission generally of short duration assigned to a military force to make possible the introduction of follow-on forces," does not completely coincide with the Marine Corps' concept of the single force. Obviously, due to the size of the Marine Corps, the intent in this concept is that when a MEB enables a MEF, the MEF

would absorb the MEB to fill out its force structure. The Marine Corps is not large enough to have it another way when dealing at the MEF level. This is not necessarily the case with the MEU(SOC) nor is it in the best interest of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps has advertised the MEU(SOC) as a small rapid response MAGTF with the capability to conduct selected maritime special operations in any condition, in any theater around the world. This special operation capability is something the MEU(SOC) can offer a theater commander that no other MAGTF possesses. All the regional theaters have more than one potential conflict that demands attention and may require a rapid military response. To incorporate the MEU into the MEB would reduce the flexibility the theater commander would have in responding to those potential crises. A theater commander would much rather have a fully staffed MEB to employ in his theater rather than have the MEB subsume the MEU and give up the flexibility associated with the MEU(SOC).

### **Unity of Command and Command Relationships**

Unity of command and command relationships are other factors that affect the MEU(SOC) in its ability to conduct an enabling mission. The Amphibious Squadron (Phibron) and MEU staffs develop relationships during the Staff Planning Courses and at sea exercises during the predeployment work-up period. This relationship builds trust, confidence, and a Navy/Marine Corps team approach to everything task they undertake. This teamwork gives the ARG/MEU(SOC) a synergy that allows them to plan and execute difficult missions on short notice. The introduction of a higher command element from the Navy and the MEB into the ARG/MEU(SOC) would disrupt this synergy and cause delays, confusion, and possible morale, and readiness issues within the unit. This was

evident in the 5<sup>th</sup> MEB's deployment during the Persian Gulf War in 1990. The 11<sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC) was subsumed by the 5<sup>th</sup> MEB after the predeployment work-ups and sailed with 13 other amphibious ships to the Persian Gulf. The introduction of the MEB staff created obstacles and another layer of bureaucracy that the ARG/MEU staffs, who had been working together for the past six months, had to overcome. Morale suffered as the staffs felt like they were serving two masters. Although this is not the way the chain of command is designed to work, or what was supposed to happen, the fact that the major supporting command staffs had no history of working with the MEB fostered the natural tendency of people to work with those they are most comfortable with, i.e., the original MEU staff.

## **Training Issues**

As stated above, the Phibron and MEU staffs train together for six months during the MEU(SOC) Predeployment Training Program [MEU(SOC)PTP] and build the relationships, playbooks, and standard operating procedures that enable them to plan and conduct demanding missions on a six-hour notice. The MEU(SOC)PTP is an extremely demanding program that consumes that majority of the six months work-up period before the deployment. The goal at the end of all this training is to build the Navy/Marine Corps team and certify the MEU as special operations capable. This type of training relationship does not currently exist between the MEU and the MEB (MEF Fwd). The MEU and MEB (MEF Fwd) seldom conduct integration exercises or practice any type of enabling exercises. Actual MEU-MEB integration training is limited to very few exercises. Moreover, even during these exercises, the MEU is concentrating on its SOC qualification

and does not consider how the MEU would conduct an enabling mission in support of the MEB. The MEU(SOC) possesses the required skills but is not tasked to perform the mission during its predeployment work-ups. If the MEU participating in the exercise is not in a MEU(SOC) work-up, the elements of the MEU are normally working on individual requirements, paying little attention to building rapport and developing SOPs to be executed in time of conflict.

### **Naval Amphibious Warfare Deficiencies**

The capabilities of the MEU(SOC) to enable a MEB are important issues, but the deficiencies of the Navy in relation to amphibious warfare capabilities seriously jeopardizes two of the three types of MEBs. The MPF and ATF MEBs are dependant on the ability of the Navy to conduct numerous missions in support of the MEU(SOC) and MEB. The Navy is deficient in three areas: amphibious shipping, mine-counter measures (MCM), and naval surface fire support (NSFS).

As stated in chapter 3, the Navy is short numerous amphibious ships to conduct MEB operations. Based on the after action reports submitted by the 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> MEBs, the required number of ships to transport and employ an ATF MEB is between nineteen and twenty-two ships.<sup>20</sup> The Navy cannot realistically accomplish this mission with the numbers of amphibious ships currently in the inventory or forecasted in the future. In order for the Navy to meet this requirement, it would have to transit ships from one coast to the other in order to assemble an armada with the capability to conduct an ATF MEB lift. This problem would be exacerbated by the fact that the amphibious task force carrying

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<sup>20</sup> Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Marine Corps Lessons Learned [CD-ROM], 1996.

the MEU(SOC) will most likely already be deployed and unavailable to spread-load equipment and personnel in support of the MEB task force. The Navy is not currently addressing this deficiency and the problem will continue into the projected future.

The second deficiency the Navy has that jeopardizes the Marine Corps' ability to conduct an MPF or ATF MEB is the lack of a credible MCM capability. These deficiencies were identified during the Persian Gulf War but little advance has been made in correcting it. The problem with the current capability is three fold. First, the time required to clear a minefield is enormous. Each lane has to be cleared individually by SEAL teams or line charges and three to four weeks is not an unreasonable time-line in preparing these routes for an amphibious landing. This is a best-case estimate and assumes the required assets are in theater and do not have to transit from homeports in the United States, which is an extremely slow process. For example, if the assets located in Gulfport, Texas were required to transit to the Arabian Gulf it would take in excess of thirty days just to reach the objective area. The second problem is the vulnerability of the assets tasked with conducting the mine-clearing mission. Mine clearing assets are required to



**Figure 3**  
LCAC Approaching the Beach

transit into the very shallow water and surf zone in order to deliver charges and blast lanes and landing zones for the landing craft. Unfortunately, all this would take place in range of the enemy's direct and indirect fires. One of the current assets used to perform this mission is the Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC); see Figure 3, which has no armor and a very limited ability to absorb enemy fire. This, coupled with the length of time required to clear a path, jeopardizes the MEB's ability to

conduct an effective amphibious assault. All this would take place in range of the enemy's direct and indirect fires.<sup>21</sup> The Navy is not the only one to blame for this deficiency. Once on the beach, the Marine Corps has very little capability to rapidly clear the beach and obtain the maneuver space required to build-up a beachhead.

The final deficiency the Navy has that jeopardizes the Marine Corps ability to conduct an ATF MEB is that lack of naval surface fire support (NSFS). The emphasis in this deficiency is on gunfire and not surface fire support. As the Navy retired the battleships, it lost the capability to project copious amounts of high explosive ordnance down range in support amphibious operations. They replaced these battleships with platforms that primarily fire missiles and 5-inch 54 surface guns. Neither of these systems can create the

destructive or suppressive fire provided by the 16-inch guns of the battleship. When comparing the 5-inch 54 guns to the 16-inch guns of the battleship, the Navy has lost range as well as firepower. To make the situation even worst, unlike the battleship in Figure 4, the Navy, as a force protection issue, stations these ships in fire support areas (FSA) farther out from the beach, which further limits their effective range and support. In effect, NSFS has become ineffective supporting amphibious operations, placing the preponderance of fire support responsibility on aviation assets. The Navy has recognized this deficiency and is developing programs to correct it. The Navy is pursuing four programs to meet the



Figure 4  
USS New Jersey Firing Broadside in  
Korea, 1951

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<sup>21</sup> Short, Billy J., Mines Challenge Our Maneuver. Marine Corps Gazette, March 1999, 28.

needs of surface fire support. The programs are the 5-inch 62 Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM), the 155mm Advanced Gun System (AGS), the Tactical Tomahawk (TACTOM), and the Advanced Land Attack Missile (ALAM). The 5-inch 62 ERGM is a system designed to replace the older 5-inch 54 guns and capable of firing guided projectiles up to 63 nm. This program is “on track” and has a scheduled initial operating capability (IOC) of 2001. The second program is the 155mm AGS. The 155mm AGS, designed for use on the DD 21, will have the ability to carry an assortment of guided munitions up to the range of 100 nm. This program, tied to the DD 21, has an IOC of 2009. This gun is capable of providing the equivalent of two six-gun batteries of artillery for throw weight missions, and up to six battery equivalents for stationary targets/destruction missions.<sup>22</sup> The ALAM is a missile program designed to accompany the 155 mm AGS on the DD 21 and fulfill the mid-range fire support needs of the Marine Corps with a range out to the 300 nm. This system is capable of a variety of munition payloads depending on the requirements of the designated target. The TACTOM is a long-range tactical missile capable of providing a variety of munitions out to a range of 1,600 nm. The missile has the capability to loiter “on-call” for a period before attacking its designated target. This ability to loiter allows the TACTOM to be reprogrammed, if required, to meet the needs of Marines ashore requesting calls for fire.

This chapter summarizes shortfalls that, while not necessarily associated with the MEUs, would adversely affect the MEU’s ability to enable the MPF and ATF MEBs.

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<sup>22</sup> Langley, Michael. Major, N86 Naval Surface Fire Support brief to Command and Staff students, 29 February 2000. Information used with permission.

## Chapter 5

### Recommendations and Conclusions

#### **Marine Corps Recommendations**

There are three recommendations for the Marine Corps. The first concerns the utilization of the MEU(SOC). The second is a structure and training issue. The third concerns equipment and training tactics and procedures (TTPs).

#### **Utilization**

How the Marine Corps should employ the MEU as a supporting unit or a force provider is a subject worthy of its own research paper and will only be touched upon in this paper. It is the author's opinion that the MEU(SOC), if at all possible, should be utilized as an enabling force as defined in MCRP 5-12C, ("a time sensitive mission generally of short duration assigned to a military force to make possible the introduction of follow-on forces....") and not as a force provider. If the Marine Corps can support the MEB without subsuming the MEU(SOC) it will provide the CinC or JTF commander with greater flexibility within his theater. This approach of keeping the MEU as an independent maneuver element in support of the MEB would allow the MEB to maintain MAGTF integrity and the MEU(SOC) to continue to provide a special operations capability that the MEB does not possess. These points become more important in a theater that has multiple contingencies with a theater commander who wants to be able to respond rapidly to anyone of them. All theaters in which we currently operate have more than one contingency that could require a military response within a very short period. By subsuming the MEU, the MAGTF will lose some of the synergy that enables it to respond rapidly with minimal notice. Tasking a

MEU(SOC) to enable and then support a MEB as a separate maneuver element until stabilization seems to be the best approach. This type of employment would preserve the synergy of the MEU and provide a force multiplier to the MEB and the flexibility needed to support the regional CinC or JTF commander.

## **Structure and Training**

As the Marine Corps continues with the growth process associated with the activation of the MEBs, attention needs to be focused in the area of how the MEB is structured and trained. To be completely successful the MEB needs to have a standing staff with the primary duty of training, equipping, and preparing a MEB for employment. By assigning these responsibilities as collateral duties to members of the MEF staff, the stage is set for the MEBs to suffer from some of the same problems that were associated with the MEF Fwd. The most notable problems are that the MEB will be an after thought and nothing more than an advance party for the MEF vice a standing MAGTF. After establishing the MEB staff as a standing organization, the schedules of the MEB and MEUs need to be structured and coordinated to coincide with the MEU(SOC) work-up and include MEB size exercises (MEBEX) like Kernel Blitz. These MEBEXs should be structured so that the MEU would be tasked to conduct an enabling mission in one of two ways. Half of the MEBEXs should have the MEB subsume the MEU and the others should have the MEU remain an independent maneuver element in support of the MEB. This type of structuring can easily be accomplished by working with the Special Operations Training Groups (SOTG) and Tactical Exercise Control Groups (TECG) located in the G-7s of all three MEFs. A MEBEX should be inserted during the final phase of the MEU(SOC) PTP in

conjunction with the fleet exercise (FLEETEX) or special operation capable exercise (SOCEX) and be a mission essential task for SOC qualification.<sup>23</sup> The MEB staff should attend the R2P2 training with the MEU staff in order to facilitate planning rather than hinder it if the MEB is required to subsume the MEU. At first glance, this looks as if it will add additional burden to the MEUs during an already demanding schedule, but the enabling mission could be incorporated into one of the airfield or port seizures the MEU is already required to conduct during the FLEETEX and SOCEX. The benefit of this type of exercise is that it would flush out the inherent problems with the MEU enabling the MEB and provide valuable lessons learned to improve the capabilities and utility of this reemerging MAGTF.

### **Equipment, Tactics Training and Procedures (TTP)**

The final recommendation for the Marine Corps deals with equipment and TTPs associated with the MCM efforts. The Marine Corps needs to continue to seek MCM improvements in the surf-zone and on the beach. It is hard to justify condemning the Navy for not improving their MCMs when once they have cleared a lane for our landing forces, we cannot move off the beach because we do not have the capability to clear the mines effectively and rapidly. Marines at N85 and various other locations at headquarters Marine Corps are currently working these issues concurrently with the Navy seeking the improvements so desperately needed.

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<sup>23</sup> The FLEETEX and SOCEX are exercises conducted during the final phase of the MEU(SOC)PTP on-board ARG shipping with a focus on conventional and selected maritime special operation mission profiles.

## **Navy Recommendations**

Simply stated, the recommendations for the Navy are to continue efforts to correct the deficiencies in amphibious shipping, MCMs and NSFS.

### **Amphibious Shipping**

The Navy needs to acknowledge, address, and then develop a plan to fix the deficiency in amphibious lift. Numerous programs within the Navy compete with the procurement of amphibious shipping. These programs range from nuclear aircraft carriers and the planes that operate off them to submarines and command and control systems. Unfortunately, there is not enough money in the Department of Defense and the Department of the Navy to purchase all the platforms and equipment needed. Having stated that, it must be emphasized how important it is to have an amphibious assault capability. The United States only has two methods of forcible entry: airborne and amphibious assault. The Navy is jeopardizing amphibious assault as a forcible entry option by not funding the development and procurement of sufficient amphibious shipping. This problem is only going to get worst as the Marine Corps strives to realize its vision of operational maneuver from the sea and places more emphasis on the need for amphibious shipping. Even if the Navy sets a plan in motion today, it would take upwards of twelve years before the effects would be realized in the fleet.

## Naval Surface Fire Support

The final recommendation for the Navy is to develop a credible NSFS or reinstate the battleships. Figure 5 is provided to impress the firepower associated with a battleship.



**Figure 5**  
USS New Jersey Firing a Demonstration

The current capabilities are inadequate in support of amphibious forces going ashore. The Navy's solution of developing the extended range guided munition

(ERGM), which does not have the capability to destroy tanks or hardened bunkers, does not satisfy the Marine Corps requirement for high explosive support fires.<sup>24</sup> As discussed in chapter 4, the 5-inch 54 guns are inadequate too. The introduction of the DD 21 and the 155mm AGS will provide the needed fire support but the IOC of this system is not projected until 2009.

At the beginning of this paper, it was questioned whether the MEU(SOC) had become too SOC-centric and lost the capability of performing an enabling mission in support of a MEB. By examining the support requirements each type of MEB needs to be introduced into a theater and comparing that with the capabilities associated with a MEU(SOC), it has been demonstrated that a MEU(SOC) is capable of enabling all types of MEBs to a certain extent. The MEU(SOC) is better suited to perform task in support of an MPF or ACF MEB than in it is in support of an ATF MEB. MEU(SOC) units train for the mission of airfield and port seizures and conduct limited training with respect to amphibious assault.

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<sup>24</sup> Lehman and Stearman, National Assets: The Navy's Iowa-Class Battleships Can Bridge Joint Warfare's Naval Surface Fire Support Gap. Armed Forces Journal International, October 1999, 84.

When tasked to support an ATF MEB, the MEU(SOC) is capable of performing limited advance operations in support of a landing, but the MEU(SOC) is extremely limited in its ability to conduct an amphibious assault or establish a lodgment on a contested beach in support of the MEB. The MEU(SOC) program supports the Marine Corps single force concept and is capable of enabling a MEB with its current level of training and force structure. Outside the purview of the MEU(SOC) there are numerous areas in which the Marine Corps and Navy are deficient when supporting an amphibious assault. The issue is not that the Navy and Marine Corps are negligent in supporting amphibious operations, the issue is a lack of priority the Navy has given the amphibious or “gator” navy and the lack of priority the Marine Corps has given to Mine-Counter Measures. Both services are making headway in these areas and if continued will increase the likelihood of a successful assault for the MEB or any other size MAGTF.

These conclusions and recommendations, although not all directly related to the ability of the MEU(SOC) to enable a MEB, influence the success of the MEB, and the Navy/Marine Corps team in any amphibious operation at any level.

## GLOSSARY

|                |  |
|----------------|--|
| <b>ACF</b>     | Air Contingency Force                    |
| <b>AE</b>      | Assault Echelon                          |
| <b>AGS</b>     | Advance Gun System                       |
| <b>ALAM</b>    | Advanced Land Attack Missile             |
| <b>ARG</b>     | Amphibious Ready Group                   |
| <b>ATF</b>     | Amphibious Task Force                    |
| <b>BLT</b>     | Battalion Landing Team                   |
| <b>CINC</b>    | Commander in Chief                       |
| <b>ERGM</b>    | Extended Range Guided Munition           |
| <b>EX</b>      | Exercise                                 |
| <b>FMFRP</b>   | Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication |
| <b>IOC</b>     | Initial Operating Capability             |
| <b>ITG</b>     | Initial Terminal Guidance                |
| <b>FARP</b>    | Forward Arming and Refueling Point       |
| <b>FLEETEX</b> | Fleet Exercise                           |
| <b>FSA</b>     | Fire Support Area                        |
| <b>JTF</b>     | Joint Force Commander                    |
| <b>LAAD</b>    | Low Anti-Air Defense                     |
| <b>LCAC</b>    | Landing Craft Air Cushion                |
| <b>MAGTF</b>   | Marine Air Ground Task Force             |
| <b>MCM</b>     | Mine-Counter Measures                    |

|                |  |
|----------------|--|
| <b>MCRP</b>    | Marine Corps Reference Publication             |
| <b>MCO</b>     | Marine Corps Order                             |
| <b>MEB</b>     | Marine Expeditionary Brigade                   |
| <b>MEU</b>     | Marine Expeditionary Unit                      |
| <b>MHG</b>     | MEB Headquarters Group                         |
| <b>MPF</b>     | Maritime Prepositioned Force                   |
| <b>MSC</b>     | Military Sea Command                           |
| <b>MSPF</b>    | Maritime Special Purpose Force                 |
| <b>NCA</b>     | National Command Authority                     |
| <b>NSFS</b>    | Naval Surface Fire Support                     |
| <b>OAS</b>     | Offensive Air Support                          |
| <b>PHIBRON</b> | Amphibious Squadron                            |
| <b>PTP</b>     | Predeployment Training Program                 |
| <b>R&amp;S</b> | Reconnaissance and Surveillance                |
| <b>R2P2</b>    | Rapid Response Planning Process                |
| <b>SEAL</b>    | Sea Air Land Detachment (Naval Special Forces) |
| <b>SIGINT</b>  | Signal Intelligence                            |
| <b>SLOC</b>    | Sea Lines of Communication                     |
| <b>SOC</b>     | Special Operations Capable                     |
| <b>SOCEX</b>   | Special Operations Capable Exercise            |
| <b>SOTG</b>    | Special Operations Training Group              |
| <b>TACTOM</b>  | Tactical Tomahawk Missile                      |

**TECG**      Tactical Exercise Control Group

**TTP**      Training Tactics and Procedures

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## APPENDIX A

The four broad categories, Amphibious Operations, Direct Action Operations, Military Operations Other Than War, and Support Operations are separated by capabilities within each category.

### **Amphibious Operations:**

- Amphibious Assault
- Amphibious Raid
- Amphibious Demonstration
- Amphibious Withdrawal

### **Direct Action Operations:**

- In-Extremis Hostage Recovery
- Seizure / Recovery of Offshore Energy Facilities
- Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Operations (VBSS)
- Specialized Demolition Operations
- Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP)
- Seizure / Recovery of Selected Personnel or Material
- Counter-proliferation (CP) of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

### **Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW):**

- Peace Operations
  - Peace Keeping
  - Peace Enforcement
- Security Operations
- Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)

- Reinforcement Operations
- Joint / Combined Training / Instruction Teams
- Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster relief

### **Supporting Operations:**

- Tactical Deception Operations
- Fire Support Planning, Coordination, and Control in a Joint / Combined Environment
- Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) / Electronic Warfare (EW)
- Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT)
- Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S)
- Initial Terminal Guidance (ITG)
- Counterintelligence Operations (CI)
- Airfield / Port Seizure
- Limited Expeditionary Airfield Operations
- Show of Force
- JTF Enabling Operations
- Sniping Operations <sup>25</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> MCO 3120.9A, with change 1. Policy For Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)). November 1997.